Laker Airways and the Courts: A New Method of Blocking the Extraterritorial Application of U. S. Antitrust Laws by Cannon, Rober
Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 7 (1985) 63-87
North-Holland
LAKER AIRWAYS AND THE COURTS: A NEW METHOD OF




The Laker Airways antitrust litigation [1] has renewed political tensions
between the United States and the United Kingdom over the former's extrater-
ritorial application of its antitrust laws [2]. In November, 1982, the liquidator
of Laker Airways, Ltd. (Laker) brought suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia against several major airlines [3]. Laker's com-
plaint alleged that the airlines had engaged in a predatory price fixing
conspiracy [4] in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts [5]. Instead of
directly challenging the district court's jurisdiction, four defendants, two
British airlines and two other European airlines (collectively "the airline
defendants"), attempted to escape U.S. jurisdiction by seeking from the British
courts [6] an injunction restraining Laker from pursuing its antitrust action.
The airline defendants' success in obtaining an injunction from the British
Court of Appeal enabled them, in effect, to circumvent the jurisdiction of the
U.S. courts instead of directly challenging it. The injunction, when combined
with the effect of blocking orders issued under the United Kingdom's Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act of 1980 [7], created a new method of blocking the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Although the House of Lords
reversed the Court of Appeal's issuance of an injunction [8], the House did not
provide adequate safeguards against the future issuance of a similar injunction
[91.
This Comment will examine the Laker controversy in the context of the
political dispute between the United Kingdom and the United States over the
latter's extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws. The first section sum-
marizes the facts of Laker's complaint and the judicial proceedings. The
Comment then explores the irreconcilable differences between the British and
U.S. theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction and notes the attempts of some
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U.S. courts to accommodate foreign sovereign interests implicated in private
disputes. The next section analyzes the principal judicial actions taken in the
Laker litigation. This discussion focuses on the decision by the Court of
Appeal [10] to issue a permanent injunction against Laker. The Comment
argues that the Court of Appeal not only applied an inappropriate legal
standard, but also applied it improperly in order to reach a result compatible
with the U.K. executive's position [11]. The court considered a treaty it had no
power to interpret and accepted the validity of an argument based on that
treaty's interpretation. In examining the effect of the blocking order on the
litigation, the court gave present effect to a future injury that would not occur.
The Comment suggests that the Court of Appeal's disregard for comity invited
retaliation from the U.S. courts whose jurisdiction was threatened [12]. The
final section considers the House of Lords' reversal of the Court of Appeal.
The Comment argues that the House of Lords did not adequately protect
against a recurrence of the Laker problem. Without such protection, the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws may again be blocked by an
antisuit injunction issued in conjunction with a blocking order.
2. The Laker litigation: allegations and actions
2.1. Factual background
Laker began operations in 1966 as a charter carrier, but in 1971 introduced
its "Skytrain" service, offering regularly scheduled flights at low fares [13]. By
attracting additional passengers with lower fares and relatively few restrictions,
Laker hoped to establish its Skytrain service in the lucrative North Atlantic
market [14]. When Laker began its New York to London service, its fare was
$115, significantly lower than the comparable $313 economy fare offered by
the major airlines. Laker's Skytrain service was initially very successful, and at
its peak of operations in 1981, approximately one of every seven passengers
flying between the United States and England was a Laker passenger [15].
Laker alleged that the airline defendants responded to the threat of its price
competition by engaging in a predatory pricing scheme. Each time Laker
attempted to secure government approval to enter a new route market,
defendants Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am), Trans World
Airlines, Inc. (TWA), and British Airways Board (BA) allegedly agreed to offer
below-cost services on that route and to arrange their schedules in order to
deprive Laker of passengers [16]. The defendants planned to incur short-term
losses in order to eliminate Laker as a competitor and to later raise prices to
recoup those losses [17].
Laker experienced financial difficulties when it expanded into new route
markets and purchased new aircraft [18]. The company suffered additional
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losses when Pan Am, TWA and BA lowered their fares to meet Laker's
Skytrain fares in response to Laker's refusal to end its price competition [19].
Laker also alleged that these defendants paid travel agents to divert its
passengers from Laker, pressured its largest customers to change carriers, and
spread false rumors of its impending bankruptcy [20].
Laker temporarily recovered from its financial difficulties by successfully
renegotiating its debts with some of its creditors, including McDonnell Doug-
las Corporation, McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, and General Elec-
tric Company [21]. In addition, McDonnell Douglas agreed to exchange $9.4
million in loans for Laker stock [22]. Upon learning of this financing scheme,
Laker's competitors attempted to block it. Several airlines pressured McDon-
nell Douglas to withdraw its proposed financing by threatening to suspend
future purchases or to demand similar equity participation financing. The
airlines successfully influenced Laker's creditors. The proposed financing
scheme collapsed and Laker was forced to enter into liquidation proceedings in
February, 1982 [24].
2.2. Summary of the Laker litigation
The Laker litigation began on November 24, 1982, when the liquidator of
Laker's airline operations filed a complaint with the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia [25]. Six airlines and two corporations were
named as defendants: Pan Am, TWA, BA, British Caledonian Airways Ltd.
(BC), Lufthansa German Airlines (Lufthansa), Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd.
(Swissair), McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and McDonnell Douglas Finance
Corporation [26]. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and Sabena Belgian
World Airlines (Sabena) later became parties when a second antitrust suit was
consolidated with the original one [27]. The complaint alleged a combination
and conspiracy to restrain and monopolize commerce in violation of the
Sherman Act [28] and requested treble damages under the Clayton Act [29].
The complaint also alleged an intentional tort causing substantial harm to
Laker's business [301.
On January 21, 1983, BA filed a declaratory judgment action against Laker
in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division [31]. BA requested a
declaration of nonliability to Laker and a permanent injunction preventing
Laker from proceeding with its antitrust claim in the United States. Judge
Parker of the Queen's Bench Division granted an ex parte interim injunction
restraining Laker from taking kny steps in its U.S. action or in the British
courts that would in any way prevent BA from proceeding in its own British
action [32]. BC, Lufthansa, and Swissair immediately obtained similar injunc-
tions [33].
On January 24, 1983, Judge Greene of the district court responded to the
British injunctions by issuing a temporary restraining order preventing the
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other defendants from obtaining injunctions that would interfere with his
jurisdiction [34]. He issued a similar temporary restraining order against KLM
and Sabena on February 15, 1983 [35].
On March 2, Judge Parker issued without notice to either Laker or the
district court a temporary injunction preventing Laker from taking any further
steps against BA and BC in the district court [36]. Judge Greene, fearing that
the remaining defendants would obtain similar injunctions and effectively
deprive him of jurisdiction over the case, issued on March 9 a preliminary
injunction preventing KLM, Sabena, and the four American defendants from
taking any actions in a foreign forum which would interfere with the progress
of the pending district court case [37].
Judge Parker considered the British defendants' motion for a permanent
injunction against Laker on May 20 [38]. He denied the motion, holding that
the district court properly had jurisdiction over the matter and that there was
no ground for English judicial interference [39]. After weighing the private and
public interests implicated by the airlines' request, Judge Parker concluded that
the irreparable harm that an injunction would cause Laker outweighed any
competing interests [40].
On June 23 and July 1, the British government attempted to block the
progress of Laker's action in the district court. The Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry issued an order and directions (collectively, "the blocking order")
[41] under the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 [42]. The Secretary
determined that British trading interests were threatened by the U.S. antitrust
action and a concurrent grand jury proceeding. He ordered that, without his
consent, "no person or persons in the United Kingdom" could comply with
any request by the Department of Justice, the grand jury or the district court
to produce "any commercial information" [43]. This order also reflected the
British government's view that air traffic between the United States and the
United Kingdom is regulated exclusively by a treaty between the two countries
signed in Bermuda on July 23, 1977, ("Bermuda 2") [44] and that the
continuation of Laker's antitrust claim was a breach of the U.S. government's
obligations under the treaty [45].
On July 26, 1983, the British Court of Appeal reversed Judge Parker's denial
of a permanent injunction against Laker [46]. After reconsidering the issues in
light of the effect of the blocking order [47], the Court of Appeal granted an
injunction restraining Laker, or anyone acting on its behalf, from proceeding
in the district court [48]. The injunction also required Laker to use its best
endeavors to procure the dismissal of the British airlines from the district court
action [49]. The Court of Appeal denied Laker permission to appeal to the
House of Lords [50].
On November 17, 1983, Judge Greene appointed an amicus curiae to
explore ways of breaking the courts' deadlock [51]. Judge Greene's opinion
criticized the actions of the British courts and reflected his determination to
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maintain jurisdiction [52]. The report of the amicus curiae rejected Judge
Greene's suggestion that a guardian ad litem be appointed to proceed with the
litigation on behalf of Laker [53]. The report also counseled against Judge
Greene's proposal that the U.S. government take part in the litigation as an
anicus curiae [54]. Finally, the report applied principles of comity to the
situation faced by the district court, concluding that such considerations
militated against the district court's attempt to proceed further against the
British airline defendants [55).
On March 6, 1984, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed Judge Greene's grant of a preliminary injunction restraining KLM
and Sabena from seeking a British antisuit injunction [56]. After exploring the
issues raised by the Laker controversy, the court's opinion rejected a
judicial-political compromise in the name of comity and approved Judge
Greene's attempts to retain his jurisdiction [57].
On July 19, 1984, the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeal [58]. Although the House of Lords' decision defused the conflict
between the British and U.S. courts, it left open the possibility of a recurrence
of this type of conflict under similar circumstances.
3. The jurisdictional conflict behind the Laker controversy
The Laker controversy highlights the irreconcilable conflict between U.S.
and British theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the area of antitrust law.
According to the British, principles of international law limit a state's power to
prescribe laws regulating economic behavior that occurs outside its territory
[59]. Under the U.S. position, however, international law does not prohibit the
exercise of jurisdiction over conduct that produces harmful effects on domestic
commerce [60].
3.1. The United States' theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction
The territoriality principle is generally recognized as a basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction [61]. Under this principle, a state may regulate activity that occurs
within its territory [62]. The territoriality principle has been expanded, how-
ever, to encompass more complex jurisdictional situations [63].
The effects doctrine [64] is a modern development in the theory of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction. According 'to this doctrine, a state may assert jurisdiction
over criminal conduct which, although performed outside its territory, pro-
duces harmful effects within it [65]. Although the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice first articulated the effects test in 1927 [66], the ambiguity
inherent in the term "effects" has led to continuing disagreement over its
application [67]. Nevertheless, the doctrine has gained judicial acceptance in
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the United States and has been recognized in several western European nations
[68].
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa") [69] introduced the
effects doctrine into U.S. antitrust law. Although recognizing that principles of
international law limited the scope of the Sherman Act, Alcoa found that
Congress had the power to prescribe legislation prohibiting conduct that
occurred outside U.S. Territory [70]. Absent congressional intent to prohibit
all foreign restraints of trade affecting U.S. commerce, however, Alcoa re-
quired that the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach should apply only to
restraints of trade that intended to affect, and in fact produced an effect, upon
U.S. commerce [71]. Because of the presence of both requirements, this
formulation has been described as an "intent-effects" test [72].
Alcoa's intent-effects test has been criticized by courts, commentators, and
foreign authorities [73]. Many critics focus on the test's failure to accommodate
other states' interests under notions of international comity [74]. Other critics
view the test as inconsistent with principles of international law because it
extends jurisdiction not only to criminal acts, but also to economic behavior
that many nations sanction [75]. Some commentators criticize the difficulty in
applying the test because of the uncertainty of determining intent and defining
the degree of effect necessary before asserting jurisdiction [76].
U.S. courts and Congress have accepted a limited version of Alcoa's
intent-effects test. The cases require that the adverse effects on U.S. commerce
be direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable [77]. The Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 requires "a 'direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable' effect on U.S. commerce" [78]. The Act's drafters
intended that the allegedly anticompetitive effect be foreseeable to a "reasona-
ble person making practical business judgments, [whether or not] actual
knowledge or intent can be shown" [79].
Despite these efforts to clarify the "intent" and "effects" necessary to assert
jurisdiction over non-U.S. defendants, courts still retain the power to define
the scope of their jurisdiction. Recognizing the adverse impact of this power,
some U.S. courts have limited the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust
laws when sensitive foreign interests are involved. Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America (Timberlane) [80] and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp. (Mannington Mills) [81], for example, employed considerations of inter-
national comity [82] in determining whether to assert jurisdiction over foreign
defendants. In Timberlane, the. court attempted to satisfy the demands of
international comity by balancing the competing national interests at stake in
the controversy [83]. Mannington Mills increased the number of factors to be
balanced under the analysis [84]. The balancing tests articulated in these cases
require the trial court to conduct a detailed analysis of competing interests.
This type of analysis has been praised for its attempt to accommodate foreign
interests in U.S. antitrust cases [85].
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The analysis proposed by Timberlane and Mannington Mills, however,
creates several difficulties. By weighing political and international considera-
tions, courts necessarily become involved in both political and international
disputes [86]. Moreover, judicial balancing may produce uncertain outcomes
[87]. While uncertainty by itself is a cause for concern, uncertainty in the
sensitive area of foreign relations is especially undesirable because to "par-
ticipate adeptly in the global community, the United States must speak with
one voice and pursue a careful and deliberate foreign policy" [88].
Despite these problems, the Timberlane-Mannington Mills analysis has been
followed in several cases [89] and has been substantially adopted by the Justice
Department in its International Antitrust Guide [90]. At least one court,
however, has explicitly refused to follow Mannington Mills [91].
3.2. The British reaction to U.S. extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction
The British government objects to the U.S. courts' extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws. The British accept only the territoriality and
nationality principles as justifications for a state's regulation of trade or
economic behavior [92]. They have criticized the use of the intent-effects test
by the United States [93] and the Commission of the European Communities
[941. They view the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law through the
intent-effects test as an attempt to export economic and political ideas. The
British consider such extraterritorial jurisdiction a violation of international
law and an infringement of British sovereignty because it impedes the United
Kingdom's right to regulate trade within its territory and over its nationals
[95].
The conflict between the United States and the United Kingdom over U.S.
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement led the British Parliament to enact the
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (the 1980 Act) [96]. The Act grants
the Secretary of State of Trade and Industry (the Secretary) broad powers with
which to counter foreign measures that, in his opinion, damage or threaten to
damage British trading interests. These powers include prohibiting any person
conducting business in the United Kingdom from complying with such foreign
measures or from obeying a foreign order to produce information located in
the United Kingdom [97]. The 1980 Act also provides that foreign judgments
awarding multiple damages to successful plaintiffs will not be enforced in the
United Kingdom [98]. The most controversial [99] portion of the 1980 Act is a
"clawback" provision that enables a defendant to recover in a British court
any punitive damage award secured in a foreign court [100].
4. The initial handling of the Laker dispute
Neither the airline defendants nor the British government directly contested
-Judge Greene's assumption of jurisdiction over the Laker litigation [101]. The
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conflict that later developed between the U.S. and British courts stemmed from
an unusual series of events which followed the filing of Laker's claim. The four
airline defendants who sought an injunction from the British courts cir-
cumvented Judge Greene's jurisdiction instead of directly challenging it. This
strategy distorted the normal judicial process and brought the U.S. and British
courts into direct conflict. The following section will analyze initial disposi-
tions of the controversy by Judge Greene of the District Court for the District
of Columbia and by Judge Parker of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench
Division.
4.1. The District Court's injunction
On March 9, 1983, Judge Greene enjoined Sabena, KLM, and the four
American defendants from taking action in foreign courts [102]. His injunction
was a response to Judge Parker's March 2 interim injunction restraining Laker
from proceeding in the U.S. courts against BA, BC, Swissair, and Lufthansa,
the original airline defendants. After reviewing precedents in which similar
injunctions had been issued, Judge Greene concluded that a court could enjoin
action in a foreign court "only in the most extraordinary of circumstances"
[103]. U.S. courts had issued such injunctions, for example, to ensure the
finality of a judgment [104] or to prevent the maintenance of vexatious
litigation [105].
Judge Greene balanced the potential injuries to each of the parties and
analyzed relevant public policy considerations. He concluded that denial of an
injunction could cause irreparable injury to Laker because the remaining
defendants might obtain injunctions, such as were eventually obtained by BA
and BC, that would block Laker's action [106]. In contrast, Sabena and KLM
would be injured only to the extent that they risked U.S. antitrust liability
[107]. The risk of such liability, however, is inherent in doing business in the
United States [108]. Judge Greene dismissed as speculative the injury that the
U.S. defendants would have suffered by having their rights decided in a British
court in their absence [109]. The balance of potential injuries favored Laker.
Assuming the truth of Laker's allegations and the grant of a British permanent
injunction, Judge Greene found substantial public interests at stake: the
economic harm to American consumers caused by a transatlantic airline price
fixing conspiracy and the emasculation of the U.S. antitrust laws by multina-
tional enterprises obtaining injunctions from a foreign court [110].
Judge Greene's support for the strong public policy underlying the U.S.
antitrust laws explains why the airline defendants did not directly challenge his
jurisdiction. By pleading comity considerations under the Timberlane, Man-
nington Mills, and Restatement analyses, the defendants could have brought
the issue squarely before the court. In addition, the British government could
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have expressed its views before the district court. Both attempts might have
proved futile, however, given the U.S. courts' traditional views of the impor-
tance of U.S. antitrust laws. In his March 9 opinion, Judge Greene expressed
his view of the Sherman Act's mandate to the courts: "[t]hese actions were
brought under a positive command of a crucial American statute that repre-
sents a very strong public policy" [111]. This statement suggests that he would
not have declined to exercise jurisdiction under a Timberlane-Mannington
Mills analysis.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit later affirmed
Judge Greene's "defensive use of an antisuit injunction," stating that there was
ample precedent to justify such a protective injunction [112].
4.2. Judge Parker's denial of a permanent injunction
On May 20, 1983, Judge Parker of the Queen's Bench Division denied the
airline defendants' application for a permanent injunction restraining Laker
from proceeding further in the U.S. courts [113]. In considering the airlines'
motion for an injunction, Judge Parker analyzed the public policy considera-
tions implicated by the case [114]. He cited Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westin-
ghouse Electric Corp. [115], for the proposition that specific governmental
policy views may be entertained in cases where a potential infringement of
British sovereignty could occur [116]. Judge Parker therefore considered it
within his discretion to weigh "specific matters of policy, be it judicially
recognized public policy as revealed by the cases, or parliamentary as revealed
by legislation, or governmental as revealed by treaty or convention" [117].
Judge Parker began his examination of public policy considerations with the
1980 Act [118], which was Parliament's response to perceived threats to U.K.
sovereignty in the field of international trade. The 1980 Act empowered the
Secretary to issue blocking orders to combat foreign discovery orders, pro-
hibited enforcement of foreign judgments in the United Kingdom, and pro-
vided a clawback provision to permit recovery of punitive damage awards
[119]. Because Parliament had not addressed a plaintiffs ability to bring such
actions, however, nothing in the 1980 Act required Judge Parker to enjoin
Laker's action [1201.
Judge Parker then examined the effect of the Bermuda 2 treaty on Laker's
claim [121]. The airline defendants urged that the treaty, signed by the United
States and the United Kingdom, governed the outcome of the Laker dispute
[122]. BA and BC argued that dne British airline could not sue another British
airline for damages alleged to flow from approved tariffs. Such a suit, if
successful, would result in a derogation of rights granted to the British
government under the treaty [123]. The Attorney General, presenting the
British government's position, argued that the United States was in breach of
its obligations under Bermuda 2 by allowing an antitrust action to be applied
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to tariff agreements approved under the regulatory mechanisms of the treaty
[124].
Judge Parker held that the treaty's effect on the antitrust laws was a matter
for the U.S. courts to decide [125]. He dismissed the airlines' argument on the
grounds that, because the treaty is not a part of English domestic law, it cannot
be employed by the airlines to deprive Laker of its right to pursue its action
[1261. Even if the treaty could be so used, Laker's complaint alleged that the
airline defendants had entered into a tariff agreement that had not been
approved pursuant to the treaty [1271.
Judge Parker concluded that none of the injuries to the defendant airlines
could outweigh the harm to Laker because the injunction would deprive Laker
of its sole legal remedy [128]. "What is unjust," he asked, "in allowing the
United Kingdom airlines, if the facts are established, from answering alike
with the American airlines for breach of the laws of the country by permission
of whose government they were operating?" [129]
5. The Court of Appeal's decision to enjoin Laker
On July 26, 1983, the Court of Appeal reversed Judge Parker and perma-
nently enjoined Laker from continuing its action in the U.S. courts [130].
Although the court's appellate review in such a case normally focuses on the
trial judge's exercise of discretion [131], the court also analyzed the effect of
the blocking order issued by the Secretary after Judge Parker's decision [132].
The court justified the injunction by applying a legal standard adapted from
cases in which the British courts had considered a stay of proceedings in one
forum so that the action could proceed elsewhere [133].
The standard employed by the court was inappropriate for a case where no
alternative forum existed for the enjoined party [134]. In addition, neither
Bermuda 2 nor the blocking order should have entered the court's analysis
[135]. Moreover, the court gave improper effect to these factors in its analysis
[136]. The basis for the injunction was the court's acceptance of the British
government's position that extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law
under the effects doctrine was invalid [137].
5.1. The Court of Appeal's standard for enjoining foreign proceedings
The Court of Appeal recognized that no British court had ever considered
restraining the prosecution of a foreign proceeding where such action would
deprive the plaintiff of access to any forum to pursue his legal remedy [138]. In
rejecting Laker's argument that the existence of an alternative forum is a
precondition for enjoining foreign proceedings [139], the court sought guidance
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from several cases [140] in which the House of Lords considered enjoining
proceedings. These cases, however, presented situations in which the House of
Lords examined the propriety of staying domestic proceedings where alterna-
tive fora were available. The standards that evolved in these cases were,
therefore, never intended to be applied in a situation such as the one before the
Court of Appeal [141].
In MacShannon v. Rockware Glass, Ltd. [142], the House of Lords examined
the legal standards that guided the courts in issuing a stay of domestic
proceedings. Lord Diplock distilled from prior decisions a formula that en-
abled an applicant to more easily obtain a stay of domestic proceedings [143].
This formula required an applicant to show both that a more convenient
alternative forum existed and that the stay did not effectively deprive the
enjoined party of a legitimate advantage in the stayed proceedings [144]. The
formula was intended to resemble the doctrine of forum non conveniens [145].
The formula was first used in the context of an injunction of foreign
proceedings in Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd. [146]. It required the
moving party to show that a more convenient English forum existed and that
the enjoined party would not be deprived of an advantage gained from pursuit
of his foreign action [147]. Castanho relied on an additional standard to guide
the court's inquiry: a "critical equation" balancing "any advantage to the
plaintiff" and "any disadvantage to the defendant" [148]. Application of the
Castanho formula to the Laker case would have counseled against issuing an
injunction because Laker did not have access to an alternative forum and
would have been deprived of a real advantage in pursuing its U.S. action.
The Court of Appeal, however, chose not to apply the Castanho formula
[149]. Instead, the court modified the critical equation into a balancing of
"whether the grant or refusal of the relief sought will create the lesser
injustice" [150]. The new equation facilitates the enjoining of foreign proceed-
ings by characterizing the court's inquiry as a balancing of the more general
"injustices" instead of a weighing of advantage and disadvantage. The Court
of Appeal should not have applied to the facts of the Laker case a standard
developed in cases involving alternative fora and stays of domestic proceed-
ings. This approach ignores the admonition of Cohen v. Rothfield [151] that
extreme caution should be exercised in enjoining foreign proceedings. Even
assuming that the new standard were appropriate, however, the court's applica-
tion of this standard did not adequately weigh the harm that Laker would
suffer if it lost its cause of action. The airline defendants' side of the critical
equation of relative injustice contained the burdensomeness of American
discovery procedures, the illegitimate advantage of Laker's seeking legal relief
in the United States, and the potential adverse effects of the blocking order on
the airlines' ability to defend in the U.S. action [152]. The inadequacies of the
latter two factors will be discussed in the following subsections.
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5.2. The effect of the Bermuda 2 treaty
Under English law, a treaty that has not been enacted by Parliament forms
no part of domestic law [153]. The Bermuda 2 treaty, although never enacted
into domestic law [154], was nevertheless considered by the Court of Appeal in
its opinion. It heard the British Attorney-General's statement that the British
government viewed the United States as having breached its obligations under
Bermuda 2 by permitting application of U.S. antitrust laws to conduct governed
by the treaty [155]. The court also acknowledged that the United States did not
interpret Bermuda 2 as precluding application of its antitrust laws [156].
Despite its lack of jurisdiction to interpret the treaty and the disagreement
between the two countries over the treaty's meaning, the Court of Appeal
entertained the British airline defendants' argument based on the meaning of
Bermuda 2 [157]. The airlines claimed that Laker could not bring an antitrust
claim regarding tariffs approved under the treaty's regulatory mechanism [158].
The court accepted the airlines' argument that because Laker enjoyed certain
benefits of British government regulation under Bermuda 2, Laker was
burdened with the obligation not to bring a U.S. antitrust claim [159]. The
court concluded that Laker's action "cast some doubt on the legitimacy of the
juridical advantage which it seeks to preserve in the United States" [160].
The Court of Appeal allowed the Bermuda 2 issue to enter into the critical
equation [161]. In reviewing the airlines' side of the equation, the court stated
that they were "entitled to rely indirectly on Bermuda 2" [162]. The British
courts, however, lack power to interpret a treaty of this type [163]. The two
countries' conflicting interpretations of the treaty and Laker's allegations
concerning conduct not governed by the treaty also militated against allowing
Bermuda 2 to enter in the critical equation. The Court of Appeal may have
acknowledged the weakness of justifying the injunction on the basis of this
issue when it admitted, "[w]hatever weight may or may not be given to the
other factors in the critical equation, in our judgment the effect of the order
and directions is decisive" [164].
5.3. The effect of the blocking order
The Court of Appeal considered the effect of the blocking order to be a
decisive factor in the critical equation [165]. This reliance on the effect of the
blocking order cannot be defended. The court found that the order rendered
the district court action wholly untriable in regard to the airlines, "since they
will be unable to defend themselves before the district court" [166]. This threat
to the airlines tipped the scales in the "critical equation" against Laker and
justified issuing the injunction.
Judge Greene criticized the court's conclusion as speculative:
[Tihe English Court of Appeal is asserting the right to abort this litigation because
documents may be needed which may not be made available under the Secretary of State's
directions, and because the nonproduction of the documents may harm the major airlines
more than Laker. To state that proposition is to demonstrate its speciousness [167].
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None of the parties had determined which documents necessary to the litiga-
tion were located in England [168]. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal could
not justifiably base its decision on the speculative harm caused by the airlines'
inability to produce documents because the Secretary could consent to dis-
closure whenever such action would protect British trading interests and
prevent harm to the British airline defendants [169].
The court not only speculated about the harm to the defendants, but also
ignored the intended effect of the blocking order. The order was designed to
reduce the burden of U.S. discovery and to minimize the risk to British trading
interests. The issuance of an injunction against foreign proceedings, a remedy
never before applied by British courts and acknowledged by them to be an
extraordinary measure, would seem unjustified in these circumstances.
5.4. A policy rationale for the injunction
The Court of Appeal recognized that an injunction against Laker would
deprive the airline of its remedy against the British airline defendants in the
U.S. courts [170]. Nevertheless, the court adhered to the British government's
opposition to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, effectively
stripping the U.S. district court of jurisdiction over Laker's claim. The Court of
Appeal considered public policy in reaching its decision. The court solicited
executive statements, reasoning that "it would be strange if in this field the
courts and the executive spoke with different voices and they should not do so"
[172]. The court accordingly heard the Attorney-General's position: "In gen-
eral, substantive jurisdiction in antitrust matters, in the view of the British
Government, should only be taken on the basis either of the territorial
principle or the nationality principle" [173].
The court carefully avoided openly basing its decision on the jurisdictional
position recommended by the Attorney-General. Nevertheless, its treatment of
the Bermuda 2 treaty, its balancing of injustices, and its reasoning regarding
the effect of the blocking order were insufficient to justify its decision.
5.5. Results of the injunction's issuance: violation of principles of comity and
invitation to foreign retaliation
Perhaps the greatest flaw in the Court of Appeal's decision was its disregard
of principles of comity. The court recognized a political stalemate between the
United States and the United Kingdom over their differing interpretations of
the Bermuda 2 treaty, but adopted its own government's interpretation as a
rationale for interfering with the jurisdiction of a U.S. court [174]. In enter-
taining its government's views on the illegality of U.S. extraterritorial antitrust
enforcement, the court brought into question the laws of another country.
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The court's broad injunction intruded on the functions of the district court.
The injunction required the British court to examine which pleadings it would
allow Laker to file in the district court and which ones it would forbid [175].
This screening procedure directly interfered with the district court's efforts to
conduct discovery in the case.
Judge Greene criticized the court's examination of "all the circumstances"
[176] of the case for ignoring U.S. interests that would be infringed by the
court's decision. He identified the United States' interest in protecting trans-
atlantic air passengers, many of whom are Americans [177], and in providing a
satisfactory forum for Laker's creditors, who are primarily American [178].
Had the airlines succeeded in their quest for a permanent injunction, the
British courts' precedent would have allowed similarly situated foreign corpo-
rations to escape antitrust liability, thereby damaging the U.S. interest in
enforcing its antitrust laws.
The Court of Appeal's disregard of comity invited retaliation by the U.S.
courts. On March 6, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed Judge Greene's preliminary injunction restraining KLM
and Sabena from taking part in any foreign action intended to block the
district court's jurisdiction [179]. The court concluded that the United States
and the United Kingdom shared concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction over the
events underlying the Laker controversy [180]. Because the British action was
instituted for the sole purpose of terminating the U.S. action, the "defensive
use" of an antisuit injunction was held to be justified [181].
The court questioned the propriety of the judiciary's previous attempts to
resolve international disputes such as the Laker controversy and concluded
that the judiciary's role should be limited to implementing domestic legislative
policies [182]. The stalemate between the British and U.S. courts was due to
their inability to resolve international political disputes [183]. The court
rejected an appeal to comity which, although appropriate in some cases, would
not be advanced by capitulating to a more aggressive adversary:
Accession to a demand for comity predicated on the coercive effects of a foreign judgment
usurping legitimately concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction is unlikely to foster the processes
of accommodation and cooperation which form the basis for a genuine system of interna-
tional comity [184].
The court also challenged the efficacy of applying the Timberlane and Man-
nington Mills analyses to the Laker case: "[T]his approach is unsuitable when
courts are forced to choose between a domestic law which is designed to
protect domestic interests, and a foreign law which is calculated to thwart the
implementation of the domestic law" [185]. The court concluded that the
political branches of the governments must resolve their disputes on their own
initiative because the courts are not the proper forum [186].
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6. The House of Lords' reversal
On July 19, 1984, the House of Lords reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeal and lifted the injunction against Laker [187]. Lord Diplock authored
an opinion that was highly critical of the Court of Appeal's decision. Lord
Scarman contributed his remarks to the Lords' decision [188]. Although the
decision of the House of Lords defused the conflict between the British and
American courts, it provides no assurance against the recurrence of similar
conflicts.
Lord Diplock questioned the Court of Appeal's reliance on public policy:
"[T]he sources of the public policy to which courts of justice give effect are to
be found in judicial decisions and in legislation and not in the views of the
executive government except in the relatively narrow field of international
relations between sovereign states" [189].
The House of Lords confronted the novel problem of an English court
enjoining a litigant from pursuing a claim before a foreign court when no other
court could provide a remedy [190]. Lord Diplock emphasized the "crucial
distinction" between cases in which only one forum can provide a remedy to
the party being enjoined and cases in which the court merely chooses between
suitable alternative fora [191]. Lord Diplock criticized the Court of Appeal's
use of the critical equation as inappropriate in the context of a single forum
case. The metaphor simply could not apply to a case in which only one side of
the equation existed [192].
Unfortunately, Lord Diplock did not distinguish between the standards to
be followed by a judge in exercising his discretion in single forum and
alternative fora cases. He noted, however, the grave consequences of issuing an
injunction in a single forum case: the trial court would essentially appropriate
a "one-sided jurisdiction," deciding the case on its merits [193]. Lord Scarman
advocated "cautiousness" on the part of a trial judge exercising such discretion
[194]. He nevertheless insisted on the trial judge's power to issue such an
injunction: "wide and flexible" equity principles permitted this remedy [195].
The House of Lords recognized a plaintiff's right to seek an injunction to
avoid "unconscionable conduct" [196] by the defendant: "[I]f under English
law a defence would be available to the injunction-seeker, [then] that defence
may be given anticipatory effect as a right not to be sued that is enforceable by
injunction in an acting for a declaration of non-liability" [197]. An example of
such an anticipatory defense is the equitable right to defend against unconsci-
onable conduct on the part of the defendant [198].
The House of Lords offered few restraints to limit the discretion of a judge
in exercising "wide and flexible" principles of equity and in defining the
parameters of unconscionable conduct. The Court of Appeal was so biased
against the U.S. antitrust laws and their extraterritorial application that it
would have considered Laker's action "unconscionable." Similarly, Judge
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parker must have considered Laker's conduct not unconscionable. The House
of Lords' decision leaves open the question of what type of conduct can justify
the extraordinary remedy of enjoining foreign proceedings.
Lord Diplock described BA's argument before the House of Lords as the
"admission to the scheduled airlines club" argument [199]. BA asserted that
Laker's voluntary submission to the airline regulatory regime precluded it from
asserting a cause of action under American antitrust laws [200]. In rejecting
this argument, Lord Diplock noted that nothing in English domestic law
governing air transport licenses either exempted BA and BC from the obliga-
tions imposed by U.S. law or prevented Laker from asserting a claim under
U.S. law [201]. Laker's conduct was not unconscionable because all three
airlines voluntarily submitted themselves to the private laws of the two nations
when they accepted licensing to do business within their jurisdictions [202].
The House of Lords did not consider the Bermuda 2 treaty in its examina-
tion of the airlines' claim that the regulatory regime precluded Laker's action.
Because Bermuda 2 forms no part of English law, no English court has
jurisdiction to assess the parties' relative rights under the treaty [203]. Lord
Diplock noted, however, that the Bermuda 2 treaty, the Federal Aviation Act
[204], and the Sherman and Clayton Acts are all part of U.S. domestic law and
thus subject to interpretation by a U.S. court [205]. He also observed that
Laker's claim was based on an agreement that was never approved by the
regulatory agency responsible for the treaty's implementation in the United
States [206].
The House of Lords also rejected what the Court of Appeal stated to be the
decisive factor in its decision, namely the potential harmful effect of the
blocking order on BA and BC [207]. These executive actions only disad-
vantaged Laker, and actually helped BA and BC in defending their interests.
The airlines were free to withhold evidence that would harm their defense
[208]. If they wished to produce evidence to aid their defense, they could
obtain the consent of the Secretary of State who was "on their side" [209]. The
Court of Appeal misinterpreted the blocking order as prohibiting the airlines
from complying with an adverse judgment. Nothing in the 1980 Act, however,
prevents them from paying a damage award [210]. Moreover, the Act allows
British airlines to recover through the clawback provision the punitive portion
of any damages paid [211].
7. Conclusion
The Laker controversy exposes a new method of blocking U.S. extraterri-
torial antitrust jurisdiction: an antisuit injunction issued on the basis of a
blocking order, both directed at a foreign judicial proceeding. The issuance of
an antisuit injunction under these conditions cannot be justified. Its adverse
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effects on international relations and private interests are well illustrated in the
Laker controversy. The Laker litigation aggravated a political dispute between
the United Kingdom and the United States over the issue of prescriptive
jurisdiction. The British Court of Appeal, in its self-confessed desire to follow
the mandate of its executive government, invoked public policy as a rationale
for issuing what it acknowledged to be an unprecedented injunction [212]. The
result was the continuation of an unfortunate trend in the British courts'
relaxation of the standards for enjoining foreign proceedings [213].
Had the Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court's denial of a permanent
injunction, the international conflict would not have been exacerbated. The
Court of Appeal, however, issued an antisuit injunction based on the blocking
order directed at Laker's U.S. antitrust action. Nothing in the blocking order
or the 1980 Act required the court to issue the injunction. Both the Act and the
blocking order were intended to minimize threats to British trading interests
and to reduce the perceived threat of U.S. discovery procedures [214]. Issuance
of an injunction where such remedial steps have been taken is unnecessary and
may provoke retaliation.
The House of Lords defused the immediate conflict but did not prevent the
recurrence of a similar controversy. Although the Lords' decision requires a
court to exercise caution before issuing such an injunction [215], it does not
further restrict the court's power to enjoin foreign proceedings. The Lords did
not explicitly forbid an antisuit injunction issued on the basis of a blocking
order.
There are several reasons why the House of Lords should prohibit antisuit
injunctions based on blocking orders. The injunction affords protection that
the blocking order already provides. The injunction disregards comity, damages
international relations, and invites foreign judicial retaliation. Despite these
arguments, the House of Lords did not preclude the possibility of the future
issuance of such injunctions. The Lords recognized the existence of a "novel
problem" but offered no novel solution.
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